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CIVIL PROCEDURE-A CORPORATION'S WAIVER OF THE ATTORNEY-
CLIENT PRIVILEGE AND WORK-PRODUCT DOCTRINE
Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. Republic of the Philippines (1991)
I. INTRODUCTION
Our legal system demands the full and open disclosure of evidence
relevant to a pending case, subject to certain exceptions.' This open
process facilitates the transfer of material between parties and allows for
effective case preparation.2 It furthers the ultimate aims of our eviden-
tiary rules, procedural fairness and the finding of truth.
3
Evidentiary privileges protect special relationships and material and
limit this information exchange. 4 Such privileges inhibit the free flow of
1. See United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 331 (1950). The Bryan Court
noted the importance of open disclosure:
Dean Wigmore stated the proposition thus: "For more than three
centuries it has now been recognized as a fundamental maxim that the
public (in the words sanctioned by Lord Hardwicke) has a right to every
man's evidence. When we come to examine the various claims of ex-
emption, we start with the primary assumption that there is a general
duty to give what testimony one is capable of giving, and that any ex-
emptions which may exist are distinctly exceptional, being so many der-
ogations from a positive general rule."
Id.
This idea is also embodied in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure gov-
erning the evidence discovery process. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26-37. The discovery
rules serve three primary purposes. First, the rules preserve important informa-
tion that might not be available at trial. Second, they serve to pinpoint the issues
in dispute between the parties. Finally, they lead to any testimony or evidence in
existence on any factual issue in controversy. See JOHN J. COUND ET AL., CIVIL
PROCEDURE 710-11 (5th ed. 1989).
For a further discussion of the principles behind open disclosure of infor-
mation, see Developments in the Law-Privileged Communications, 98 HARV. L. REV.
1450 (1985) (setting forth comprehensive discussion and summary of history of
various evidentiary privileges, their place in today's legal system and how they
might be waived) [hereinafter Privileged Communications].
2. See Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 507 (1947) ("Mutual knowledge of
all the relevant facts gathered by both parties is essential to proper litigation.").
3. See, e.g. FED. R. EvID. 102; FED. R. Civ. P. 1. The Federal Rules of Evi-
dence, in a statement of purpose, declare: "These rules shall be construed to
secure fairness in administration, elimination of unjustifiable expense and delay,
and promotion of growth and development of the law of evidence to the end
that the truth may be ascertained and proceedings justly determined." FED. R.
EvID. 102. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure state that the rules "shall be
construed to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every
action." FED. R. Civ. P. 1.
4. See Privileged Communications, supra note 1, at 1454. Privileges balance a
court's power to order evidence by allowing a person to withhold information
that the person would normally be compelled to disclose. See COUND, supra note
1, at 778. A privilege may also permit a person to preclude another from re-
(917)
1
Smallman: Civil Procedure - A Corporation's Waiver of the Attorney-Client P
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1992
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 37: p. 917
important information and reflect a policy judgment that certain mate-
rial will be withheld to protect other compelling considerations. 5
Courts, however, interpret privileges that deny access to information
carefully and narrowly, relying on the axiom that any impediment to the
open availability of information is discouraged. 6
In Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. Republic of the Philippines,7 the United
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit examined two important
evidentiary privileges: 8 the attorney-client privilege and the work-prod-
vealing information. Id. For example, the holder of the privilege may decline to
be a witness. Id. Federal Rule of Evidence 501 provides the general rule for the
interpretation of evidentiary privileges:
Except as otherwise required by the Constitution of the United
States or provided by Act of Congress or in rules prescribed by the
Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority, the privilege of a wit-
ness, person, government, State, or political subdivision thereof shall
be governed by the principles of the common law as they may be inter-
preted by the courts of the United States in the light of reason and
experience. However, in civil actions and proceedings, with respect to
an element of a claim or defense as to which State law supplies the rule
of decision, the privilege of a witness, person, government, State, or
political subdivision thereof shall be determined in accordance with
State law.
FED. R. EvID. 501.
5. In Trammel v. United States, the Supreme Court acknowledged these com-
peting considerations when it said of exclusionary rules and testimonial privi-
leges that "they must be strictly construed and accepted 'only to the very limited
extent that permitting a refusal to testify or excluding relevant evidence has a
public good transcending the normally predominant principle of utilizing all ra-
tional means for obtaining the truth.' " Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40,
50 (1980) (quoting Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 234 (1960) (Frank-
furter, J., dissenting)).
For a discussion of attorney-client privileges and the spectrum of opinions
interpreting their scope, see Marvin E. Frankel, The Search for Truth Continued.-
More Disclosure, Less Privilege, 54 U. COLO. L. REV. 51 (1982) (criticizing attorney-
client privilege and recommending narrower scope to make information more
discoverable and less likely to be within protection of privilege); Albert W. Al-
schuler, The Search for Truth Continued, the Privilege Retained. A Response to Judge
Frankel, 54 U. COLO. L. REV. 67 (1982) (agreeing that information needs to be
more obtainable but rejecting relaxation of attorney-client privilege as means of
accomplishing goal); Gerald Sobel, The Confidential Communication Element of the
Attorney-Client Privilege, 4 CARDOZO L. REV. 649 (1983) (advocating broad and
permissive test for determining which communications should be confidential
under attorney-client privilege); Fred C. Zacharias, Rethinking Confidentiality, 74
IOWA L. REV. 351 (1989) (arguing against strict confidentiality in attorney-client
communications and for well-reasoned, flexible approach based on results of
empirical studies).
6. Trammel, 445 U.S. at 50 (quoting Elkins, 364 U.S. at 234 (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting)).
7. 951 F.2d 1414 (3d Cir. 1991)
8. The Westinghouse court phrased the issue as follows:
[W]hether a party that discloses information protected by the attorney-
client privilege and the work-product doctrine in order to cooperate
with a government agency that is investigating it waives the privilege
and the doctrine only as against the government, or waives them com-
918
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uct doctrine. 9 The attorney-client privilege expressly protects commu-
pletely, thereby exposing the documents to civil discovery in litigation
between the discloser and a third party.
Westinghouse, 951 F.2d at 1417 (footnote omitted).
Thus, the Third Circuit's holding depended upon its interpretation of the
scope of the attorney-client privilege and the work-product doctrine, and the
purposes underlying these protections. See id. at 1425, 1427-28.
9. Id. The seminal Supreme Court case addressing the scope of these pro-
tections is Upjohn Co. v. United States. Upjohn, an international pharmaceutical
firm, engaged outside counsel to investigate "possible illegal" payments that
Upjohn's foreign subsidiaries might have made to foreign government officials.
Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 386-87 (1981). As part of the inves-
tigation, counsel mailed a questionnaire to all foreign managers requesting in-
formation on these "possibly illegal" payments. Id. at 387. The letter noted this
information was to be kept highly confidential. Id. The IRS became aware of
the possible existence of these payments and began an investigation into the tax
consequences for Upjohn. Id. In accordance with this investigation, the IRS
sought production of Upjohn's written questionnaires. Id. at 388. Upjohn re-
sisted and asserted that these materials were protected by the attorney-client
and work-product privileges. Id.
The Supreme Court held that these materials fell within the protection of
both privileges. Id. at 397. The Court rejected the lower court's decision to
restrict the attorney-client privilege's protection to a "control group" within the
corporation. Id. The lower court had reasoned that because a corporation was
an inanimate entity, only a corporation's senior executives would be sufficiently
close to the corporation to be a part of its identity. Id. at 390. Accordingly, the
control group would consist of these senior executives. Id.
The Supreme Court held that "[s]uch a view [the control group test]....
overlooks the fact that the privilege exists to protect not only the giving of pro-
fessional advice to those who can act on it but also the giving of information to
the lawyer to enable him to give sound and informed advice." Id. The Court
determined that the questionnaire was part of the information exchange be-
tween attorney and client necessary for the production of informed legal advice.
Id. at 394. The Court remarked that "[t]he control group test adopted by the
court below thus frustrates the very purpose of the privilege by discouraging the
communication of relevant information by employees of the client to attorneys
seeking to render legal advice to the client corporation." Id. at 392.
The Court held that the material was also within the protection of the work-
product doctrine. Id. at 397. The Court credited the government for not dis-
puting this point on appeal, noting that "[tihe Government concedes, wisely,
that the Court of Appeals erred and that the work-product doctrine does apply
to IRS summonses." Id. (citing Brief for Respondents at 16, 48). The Court
reviewed the history of the work-product doctrine, noting the doctrine's an-
nouncement in Hickman v. Taylor, and its reinforcement in recent Court deci-
sions. Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 397-98 (citing Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495
(1947); United States v. Nobles, 442 U.S. 225 (1975)). In addition, the Court
stated that the doctrine has been included in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
26(b)(3). Id. at 398 (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 26 (b)(3)). The Court also emphasized
the strong public policy underlying the work-product doctrine. Id.
The work-product doctrine is a qualified privilege and can be overcome by a
showing of substantial need. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3). The government ar-
gued in Upjohn that it had made a sufficient showing of need to overcome the
privilege. Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 399. The Court rejected this argument, emphasiz-
ing the important distinction between opinion and non-opinion work product.
Id. at 401. The Court noted the special protection accorded work product that
constitutes the attorney's mental processes under the work-product doctrine.
Id. at 400. The Court in Upjohn decided the information at issue was such opin-
3
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nications between a client and his or her attorney that were made for the
purpose of furnishing or obtaining professional legal advice or assist-
ance.' 0 The work-product doctrine safeguards material prepared by an
ion work product and that the government had not met its heavy burden of
showing substantial need. Id. at 401. The Court specifically declined to say
whether opinion work product can never be discovered but it did stress the need
for a very rigorous standard of necessity to force disclosure. Id. at 401-02.
For further discussion of the Upjohn decision and its effects, see George 0.
Burpeau, III & Kemp P. Burpeau, Attorney-Client Privilege: Post-Upjohn Assessment,
19 MEM. ST. U. L. REV. 29 (1988) (analyzing corporate attorney-client privilege
before and after Upjohn and suggesting means to encourage consistency in appli-
cation of Upjohn guidelines); Stanley A. Freedman, Corporate Attorney-Client Privi-
lege Since Upjohn, At Home and Abroad, 9 U. DAYTON L. REV. 425 (1984) (tracing
development of attorney-client privilege and evolution of exceptions resulting in
disclosure while also briefly discussing attorney-client protection in EEC); Jac-
queline A. Weiss, Beyond Upjohn: Achieving Certainty by Expanding the Scope of the
Attorney-Client Privilege, 50 FORDHAM L. REV. 1182 (1982) (arguing that Upjohn
leaves corporations with little guidance to determine which corporate communi-
cations are protected by attorney-client privilege and proposing bright line rule
that all employees' communications should be within privilege); Rex A. Ber-
tram, Comment, The Scope of the Attorney-Client Privilege for Corporations After
Upjohn Co. v. United States:A Practical Approach, 25 ST. Louis U. L.J. 821 (1982)
(examining attorney-client privilege in corporate context before and after Upjohn
and proffering five considerations to guide corporate counsel regarding attor-
ney-client privilege).
10. BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 129 (6th ed. 1990). The attorney-client privi-
lege is defined as a "client's privilege to refuse to disclose and to prevent any
other person from disclosing confidential communications between he and his
attorney." Id. Judge Wyzanski enunciated a comprehensive formulation of the
elements necessary to invoke the attorney-client privilege in United States v.
United Shoe Machinery, Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357, 358 (D. Mass. 1950). Judge
Wyzanski said:
The privilege applies only if (1) the asserted holder of the privilege is
or sought to become a client; (2) the person to whom the communica-
tion was made (a) is a member of the bar of a court, or his subordinate
and (b) in connection with this communication is acting like a lawyer;
(3) the communication relates to a fact of which the attorney was in-
formed (a) by his client (b) without the presence of strangers (c) for the
purpose of securing primarily either (i) an opinion on law or (ii) legal
services or (iii) assistance in some legal proceeding, and not (d) for the
purpose of committing a crime or tort; and (4) the privilege has been
(a) claimed and (b) not waived by the client.
Id. at 358-59.
The attorney-client privilege is well-recognized as the "oldest of the privi-
leges for confidential communications known to the common law." Upjohn, 449
U.S. at 389 (citing 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2290 (McNaughton rev. ed.
1961)). All American courts recognize this privilege. COUND, supra note 1, at
778. It is an absolute privilege, therefore when it is invoked and recognized, no
showing of compelling need can overcome the protection of the privilege. Id. at
786.
For a further discussion of the attorney-client privilege and its effects, see
Gordon W. Thomas, Privileged Communications-Attorney-Client Privilege Explained,
15 SETON HALL L. REV. 999 (1985); Jeffrey A. Deland, Comment, Expanding the
Attorney-Client Privilege: A Constitutional Mandate, 13 PAC. L.J. 437 (1982); Julia
Thomas-Fishburn, Comment, Attorney-Client Confidences: Punishing the Innocent, 61
U. COLO. L. REV. 185 (1990).
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attorney in anticipation of litigation."l
11. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3). Rule 26(b)(3) reads:
Trial Preparation: Materials. Subject to the provisions of subdivision
(b)(4) of this rule, a party may obtain discovery of documents and tangi-
ble things otherwise discoverable under subdivision (b)(l) of this rule
and prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial by or for another
party or by or for that other party's representative (including the other
party's attorney, consultant, surety, indemnitor, insurer, or agent) only
upon a showing that the party seeking discovery has substantial need of
the materials in the preparation of the party's case and that the party is
unable without undue hardship to obtain the substantial equivalent of
the materials by other means. In ordering discovery of such materials
when the required showing has been made, the court shall. protect
against disclosure of the mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or
legal theories of an attorney or other representative of a party concern-
ing the litigation.
A party may obtain without the required showing a statement con-
cerning the action or its subject matter previously made by that party.
Upon request, a person not a party may obtain without the required
showing a statement concerning the action or its subject matter previ-
ously made by that person. If the request is refused, the person may
move for a court order. The provisions of Rule 37(a)(4) apply to the
award of expenses incurred in relation to the motion. For purposes of
this paragraph, a statement previously made is (A) a written statement
signed or otherwise adopted or approved by the person making it, or
(B) a stenographic, mechanical, electrical, or other recording, or a tran-
scription thereof, which is a substantially verbatim recital of an oral
statement by the person making it and contemporaneously recorded.
Id.
This provision, enacted in 1970, codifies the work-product doctrine estab-
lished in the federal courts. Id. Unlike the attorney-client privilege, the work-
product doctrine is not an absolute privilege and may be overcome by a showing
of "substantial need" for the protected materials. See id.
Prior to codification of the work-product doctrine in the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, the Supreme Court addressed the discovery of work product in
Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947). In Hickman, the Court examined "the
extent to which a party may inquire into oral and written statements of wit-
nesses, or other information, secured by an adverse party's counsel in the course
of preparation for possible litigation after a claim has arisen." Id. at 497. The
Court upheld the work-product protection and recognized its importance by
stating:
Were such materials open to opposing counsel on mere demand, much
of what is now put down in writing would remain unwritten. An attor-
ney's thoughts, heretofore inviolate, would not be his own. Ineffi-
ciency, unfairness and sharp practices would inevitably develop in the
giving of legal advice and in the preparation of cases for trial. The ef-
fect on the legal profession would be demoralizing. And the interests
of the clients and the cause of justice would be poorly served.
Id. at 511.
The Court went on to observe that this protection can be overcome:
We do not mean to say that all written materials obtained or prepared
by an adversary's counsel with an eye toward litigation are necessarily
free from discovery in all cases. Where relevant and non-privileged
facts remain hidden in an attorney's file and where production of those
facts is essential to the preparation of one's case, discovery may prop-
erly be had.
5
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In Westinghouse, the Third Circuit analyzed the circumstances under
which a corporation waives the availability of each privilege. 12 The
court held that voluntary corporate disclosure to a governmental agency
of otherwise protected material effected a complete waiver of the privi-
leges. 13 This waiver made the disclosed information discoverable in
later lawsuits or investigations. 14 The Westinghouse decision will have an
important effect on companies' cooperation with governmental
investigators. i5
The Hickman Court reiterated the substantial burden required of a party
requesting work product, noting "that a burden rests on the one who would
invade [the attorney's] privacy to establish adequate reasons to justify produc-
tion through a subpoena or court order." Id. at 512.
The importance of protecting an attorney's work product was recently af-
firmed by the Fourth Circuit in In re Martin Marietta Corp. 856 F.2d 619 (4th
Cir. 1988), cert. denied sub nom., Martin Marietta Corp. v. Pollard, 490 U.S. 1011
(1989). The Fourth Circuit noted that "[f]irst, and most generally, opinion work
product is to be accorded great protection by the courts." Id. at 626. In support
of its position, the court quoted part of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(3):
"In ordering discovery of such materials when the required showing has been
made, the court shall protect against disclosure of the mental impressions, con-
clusions, opinions, or legal theories of an attorney or other representatives of a
party concerning the litigation." Id. (quoting FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3)).
For a further discussion of the Martin Marietta decision, see Breckenridge L.
Wilcox, Martin Marietta and the Erosion of the Attorney-Client Privilege and Work-Prod-
uct Protection, 49 MD. L. REV. 917 (1990) (arguing that Martin Marietta court's
decision further eroded attorney-client and work-product doctrine protections
while relying on questionable premises); Margaret A. Carfagno, Note, Settlement
Situations and the Maintenance of Confidentiality: A Look at the Martin Marietta Deci-
sion, 1990 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 187 (1990) (arguing that Martin Marietta court's
reasoning will deter settlements and cooperation between litigants).
For a further discussion of the work-product doctrine and its importance
and evolution, see Kevin M. Clermont, Surveying Work Product, 68 CORNELL L.
REV. 755 (1983); Sherman L. Cohn, The Work Product Doctrine: Protection Not Privi-
lege, 71 GEO. L.J. 917 (1983); Francis M. Smith, The Work Product Doctrine. Its Ori-
gin, Evolution and Status in Modern Practice, 33 S.D. L. REV. 224 (1988); Michael F.
Sweeney, The Attorney Work Product Doctrine.- Approaching Absolute Immunity?, 61 ST.
JOHN'S L. REV. 658 (1987); Charles R. Taine, Discovery of Trial Preparations in the
Federal Courts, 50 COLUM. L. REV. 1026 (1950); Leland L. Tolman, Discovery Under
the Federal Rules: Production of Documents and the Work Products of the Lawyer, 58
COLUM. L. REV. 498 (1958); CarolynJo McFatridge, Comment, The Work Product
Doctrine Revisited, 23 TULSA L.J. 105 (1987).
12. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Republic of the Philippines, 951 F.2d
1414, 1431 (3d Cir. 1991).
13. For a discussion of the facts and circumstances under which Westing-
house disclosed protected information, see infra notes 16-44 and accompanying
text.
14. Westinghouse, 951 F.2d at 1431. For a discussion of the Third Circuit's
reasoning, see infra notes 45-132 and accompanying text.
15. See Milo Geyelin & Arthur S. Hayes, Privileged Information Rights Are Lim-
ited, WALL ST.J., Dec. 23, 1991, at B6 ("The decision by the Third Circuit Court
of Appeals in Philadelphia is expected to strongly discourage companies from
turning over confidential information-especially the results of outside audits or
investigations to federal agencies."). For a discussion of the effect of the Third
Circuit's decision, see infra notes 134-48 and accompanying text.
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II. FACTS
Westinghouse Electric Corporation (Westinghouse) is one of the
world's largest industrial firms. 16 In the mid-1970s, Westinghouse
sought the prime contract to construct the Republic of the Philippines'
first nuclear power plant.17 Westinghouse retained Herminio T. Disini
as a "special sales representative" to aid in this transaction.' 8 Disini was
a close friend and business advisor of then Philippine President Ferdi-
nand Marcos.1 9 Disini agreed to champion Westinghouse's interest with
the National Power Corporation (NPC), the Philippine agency handling
contract negotiations for the nuclear power plant contract. 20 Westing-
house was subsequently awarded the contract. 2 1
A few years after Westinghouse received the contract, articles ap-
peared in the Philippine and American press alleging Westinghouse had
used Disini to bribe the government officials who had awarded Westing-
16. CORPORATE YELLOW BOOK 903 (Laura Gibbons ed., Monitor Publishing
Co., Spring 1992). Westinghouse's businesses include television and radio
broadcasting, defense electronics, financial services and the industrial, construc-
tion and electric utility markets. Id. The corporation's annual revenues exceed
$12.8 billion and it employs over 120,000 people. Id.
17. Republic of the Philippines v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 714 F. Supp.
1362, 1364 (D.N.J. 1989),petition denied, 951 F.2d 1414 (3d Cir. 1991). In 1973,
then Philippine President Ferdinand E. Marcos declared that his government
would construct the Philippines' first nuclear power plant. Id. A number of
companies, including Westinghouse, competed for parts of this very lucrative
contract. Id. Since President Marcos' 1972 declaration of martial law, he had
governed primarily by presidential decree. Id. Such presidential approval was a
prerequisite for all major contracts. Id.
18. Westinghouse, 951 F.2d at 1418. The Philippines alleged that Westing-
house, upon the recommendation of their representative in the Philippines, de-
cided it would be necessary to exert direct influence on President Marcos to gain
his assent and win the contract. Westinghouse, 714 F. Supp. at 1364-65. The Phil-
ippines further alleged that Westinghouse procured the services of a special
sales representative (SSR) to exert this influence, with the understanding that it
would be necessary for the SSR to bribe President Marcos to gain his assent. Id.
at 1365.
19. Westinghouse, 951 F.2d at 1418. Disini was a prominent Philippine busi-
nessman and close friend of President Marcos. Westinghouse, 714 F. Supp. at
1365. His wife was also Imelda Marcos' cousin and personal physician. Id. Dis-
ini demonstrated his ability to successfully lobby for Westinghouse's interest on
this matter and Westinghouse agreed to compensate him with commission pay-
ments of three percent of the contract price. Id. The Philippines alleged that
Westinghouse knew these payments were being covertly funneled to President
Marcos. Id.
20. Westinghouse, 951 F.2d at 1418. As a result of Disini's influence, West-
inghouse was given the opportunity to present its proposal at a meeting with
President Marcos and the National Power Corporation (NPC). Westinghouse, 714
F. Supp. at 1365. Shortly thereafter, President Marcos directed the NPC to ne-
gotiate the construction contract with Westinghouse. Id. This contract was
signed at a formal ceremony on February 9, 1976 and approved by President
Marcos two days later. Id. at 1366.
21. Westinghouse, 951 F.2d at 1418.
7
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house the contract.22 In response to these reported allegations, the Se-
curities and Exchange Commission (SEC) commenced an investigation
of Westinghouse regarding possible United States securities laws
violations. 23
Westinghouse engaged the law firm of Kirkland & Ellis as outside
counsel to conduct an internal investigation and to determine whether
any improper payments had been made.24 Kirkland & Ellis generated
two letters reporting its findings. 25 Westinghouse ordered Kirkland &
Ellis to disclose these findings to the SEC. 26 At the time of this disclo-
sure, Westinghouse relied on SEC confidentiality regulations which pro-
vided that the SEC would not divulge the information obtained. 27 The
SEC, however, did not retain the reports. 28
Although the SEC eventually discontinued the investigation of
Westinghouse in 1983, the Department ofJustice (DOJ) initiated its own
investigation of Westinghouse in 1978.29 The scope of the investiga-
tion encompassed Westinghouse's alleged illegal payments to obtain
contracts in the Philippines and in several other countries.30 This inves-
tigation ended after Westinghouse admitted to making illegal payments
to procure business in Egypt. 3 ' In 1986, the DOJ reactivated the 1978
investigation after Ferdinand Marcos was deposed as President of the
Philippines.3 2 A grand jury subpoena ordered Westinghouse to reveal
the letters detailing Kirkland and Ellis' internal investigation findings
and any documents involved in that probe.33 Westinghouse delivered.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id. For commentary on internal investigations, see Arthur F. Matthews,
Internal Corporate Investigations, 45 OHIO ST. L.J. 655 (1984) (reviewing growth of
internal investigations as tool for corporations); Thomas R. Mulroy, Jr. & W.
Joseph Thesing, Jr., Confidentiality Concerns in Internal Corporate Investigations, 25
TORT & INS. L.J. 48 (1989) (outlining risks and concerns facing counsel who
undertake internal corporate investigations).
25. Westinghouse, 951 F.2d at 1418.
26. Id. Westinghouse instructed Kirkland & Ellis to show the SEC one of its
letter reports and to present orally all of its findings to the SEC. Id. Kirkland &
Ellis did not turn over any of the documents underlying the report and the SEC
agreed not to retain the report. Id.
27. Id. The SEC regulations relied upon by Westinghouse provided in per-
tinent part that "[i]nformation or documents obtained by the [SEC] in the
course of any investigation or examination, unless made a matter of public rec-
ord, shall be deemed non-public." Id. at 1418 n.4 (quoting 17 C.F.R. § 203.2
(1978)). The regulations stated that SEC employees would not reveal this infor-
mation unless they were specifically authorized to disclose it. Id. (citing 17
C.F.R. § 240.04 (1978)).
28. Id. at 1418.
29. Id. at 1419.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. Westinghouse initially resisted this disclosure in an attempt to pre-
serve its attorney-client privilege and work-product protection and moved to
[Vol. 37: p. 917
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these papers on the basis of a confidentiality agreement negotiated with
the DOJ. 34 The agreement prohibited the release of the disclosed mate-
rial to any other parties. 35 The agreement also stipulated that Westing-
house did not waive its attorney-client or work-product privileges by
turning the material over to the DOJ. 36
In 1988, the Republic of the Philippines and the NPC filed suit
against Westinghouse. 37 The Philippines and the NPC contended that
Westinghouse tortiously interfered with President Marcos' performance
of the fiduciary duties he owed to the Philippine people. 38 The Philip-
pines and the NPC also claimed Westinghouse had conspired to prevent
Marcos from performing his fiduciary duties to the Philippine people
and to the NPC.39 During discovery for these two claims, the Philip-
pines and the NPC sought the documents and information Westing-
house had made available to the SEC and the DOJ during their
investigations. 40 Westinghouse refused to produce these materials, as-
serting that the materials were protected under the attorney-client and
work-product doctrine privileges.4 1 The magistrate overseeing the dis-
quash the subpoena. Id. However, Westinghouse disclosed the requested infor-
mation after entering into a confidentiality agreement with the DOJ. Id. It is
important to note that the court interpreted Westinghouse's disclosure as volun-
tary even though it was prompted by a subpoena. See id. at 1427 n,14. The court
stated that the disclosure would not have been deemed to be voluntary if West-
inghouse had not withdrawn its objection. Id. This issue of voluntariness was
particularly important in the court's analysis of the traditional waiver doctrine.
Id. at 1427. For a further discussion of this "voluntary disclosure" analysis, see
infra notes 59-73 and accompanying text.
34. Westinghouse, 951 F.2d at 1419.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. The Republic of the Philippines and the NPC filed suit against Westing-
house in the United States District Court for the District of NewJersey. Repub-
lic of the Philippines v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 714 F. Supp. 1362, 1364
(D.N.J. 1989), petition denied, 951 F.2d 1414 (3d Cir. 1991). The fifteen-count
complaint "alleged breach of contract, fraud, negligence, tortious interference
with fiduciary relationship, civil conspiracy, violation of the federal Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act and antitrust violations." Westing-
house, 951 F.2d at 1420. Pursuant to an arbitration clause in its contract with the
NPC, Westinghouse moved to stay the action pending arbitration. Id. The dis-
trict court stayed all the claims except the two claims at issue before the Third
Circuit: "(1) the claim that Westinghouse tortiously interfered with President
Marcos' performance of his fiduciary duties to the Philippine people and (2) the
claim that ... the defendants conspired to prevent Marcos from performing his
fiduciary duties to the Philippine people and to the NPC." Id.
38. Westinghouse, 951 F.2d at 1420.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. The magistrate supervising discovery held, without specifying a rea-
son, that "some of the documents were clearly protected by the attorney-client
privilege and some were protected by the work-product privilege." Republic of
the Philippines v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 132 F.R.D. 384, 386 (D.N.J. 1990).
The magistrate did not explain why the documents fell within these privileges
nor did he specify which documents were protected because he found that West-
1992] 925
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covery process, however, held that Westinghouse's prior disclosure of
information to the SEC and the DOJ in adversarial situations had waived
the protection of the attorney-client and work-product doctrine privi-
leges, despite Westinghouse's reliance upon confidentiality agreements
with the SEC and the DOJ.4 2 The United States District Court for the
District of New Jersey upheld both of the magistrate's rulings. 43 The
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed. 44
III. ANALYSIS
A. The Attorney-Client Privilege: Can It Be Selectively Waived?
The Third Circuit first addressed Westinghouse's claim that its vol-
untary disclosure of the potentially protected information to the SEC
and the DOJ did not waive Westinghouse's attorney-client privilege. 45
inghouse's voluntary disclosure to the SEC and the DOJ had waived any claim to
these privileges. Id. at 386.
42. Westinghouse, 951 F.2d at 1421. The magistrate decided that Westing-
house's voluntary disclosure constituted a waiver of the privileges on "policy
grounds." Philippines, 132 F.R.D. at 386. The magistrate reasoned: "I am satis-
fied, at least in adversarial situations such as this, that once disclosure has been
made to a government agency and a potential adversary, any confidentiality is
lost by that disclosure, notwithstanding the private agreement between Westing-
house and the government." Id.
43. Westinghouse, 951 F.2d at 1421.
44. Id. at 1431.
45. Id. at 1423. For a further discussion of the magistrate's rulings, see
supra notes 41-42 and accompanying text.
For general commentary regarding the waiver of privileged information, see
George A. Davidson & William H. Voth, Waiver of the Attorney-Client Privilege, 64
OR. L. REV. 637 (1986) (criticizing emergence of waiver theories concerning at-
torney-client privilege as unfaithful to goals and policies underlying privilege);
James M. Grippando, Attorney-Client Privilege: Implied Waiver Through Inadvertent
Disclosure of Documents, 39 U. MIAMI L. REV. 511 (1985) (contrasting conduct anal-
ysis and strict responsibility standards courts employ for determining whether
inadvertent disclosure constitutes waiver); BarryJ. Levine, Corporate Disclosure and
Limited Waiver of the Attorney-Client Privilege, 50 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 812 (1982)
(analyzing waiver doctrine against purposes of attorney-client privilege and rec-
ommending against utilization of limited waiver); Richard L. Marcus, The Perils of
Privilege: Waiver and the Litigator, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1605 (1986) (arguing that
traditional waiver doctrine imposes excessive cost on civil litigation and offering
support for fairness analysis in determining questions of waiver); Alan J. Meese,
Inadvertent Waiver of the Attorney-Client Privilege by Disclosure of Documents: An Eco-
nomic Analysis, 23 CREIGHTON L. REV. 513 (1990) (arguing that elimination of
standard waiver doctrine requiring knowledge of disclosure and intent to dis-
close for waiver to attach imposes unnecessary social costs on society and our
legal system); Theodore Harman, Note, Fairness and the Doctrine of Subject Matter
Waiver of the Attorney-Client Privilege in Extrajudicial Disclosure Situations, 1988 U. ILL.
L. REV. 999 (1988) (supporting fairness analysis for determining waiver of attor-
ney-client privilege and generally discussing waiver of privileges); Note, Inadver-
tent Disclosure of Documents Subject to the Attorney-Client Privilege, 82 MIcH. L. REV.
598 (1983) (arguing that allowing inadvertent disclosure to waive attorney-client
privilege is incompatible with current legal system in which, because of size and
complexity of litigation, documents may fall into adversaries' hands unknow-
10
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The court noted that Westinghouse was attempting to employ a "selec-
tive waiver," which entails divulging a privileged communication to one
party while continuing to assert the privilege against other parties.
46
The Third Circuit evaluated the validity of the "selective waiver" by ex-
amining two circuit opinions. 4 7 The United States Court of Appeals for
the Eighth Circuit recognized the potential use of selective waiver in Di-
versified Industries, Inc. v. Meredith.48 The United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit, however, rejected the selective
ingly, even with safety precautions in place); Raymond E. Watts, Jr., Comment,
Reconciling Voluntary Disclosure with the Attorney-Corporate Client Privilege: A Move To-
ward a Comprehensive Limited Waiver Doctrine, 39 MERCER L. REV. 1341 (1988) (not-
ing Upjohn's lack of guidance regarding circumstances constituting waiver has
created confusion among courts in interpreting this issue and advocating quali-
fied limited waiver approach).
46. Westinghouse, 951 F.2d at 1423. The court first distinguished between a
selective waiver and a partial waiver. Id. at 1423 n.7. The court viewed both of
these as falling within the general limited waiver category. Id. The court de-
fined a partial waiver as disclosing a portion of the privileged information while
trying to assert the privilege with regard to the remaining undisclosed portion.
Id. On the other hand, a selective waiver involves disclosing privileged informa-
tion to one party and claiming privilege for that same information against an-
other party. Id. The court determined that Westinghouse was attempting a
selective waiver. Id.
For a discussion of privileges in the corporate context, see Vincent C. Alex-
ander, The Corporate Attorney-Client Privilege: A Study of the Participants, 63 ST. JOHN'S
L. REV. 191 (1989) (giving results of comprehensive study of corporate attorney-
client privilege); Nancy C. Cody, The Attorney-Client Privilege and the Work-Product
Immunity Doctrine for the Corporate Client, 15 U. BALT. L. REV. 251 (1986) (discuss-
ing unpredictability and confusion regarding these privileges in corporate con-
text and providing overview of case law with recommendations on ensuring
protection of privilege); Francis M. Gregory, Protecting Privileges in Business Litiga-
tion: Practical Considerations, 58 DEF. CouNs.J. 340 (1991) (offering advice on how
to avoid waiver of privilege in business litigation); John William Gergacz, Attor-
ney-Corporate Client Privilege, 37 Bus. LAW. 461 (1982) (tracing attorney-client
privilege as applied in corporate context and discussing courts' confusion in ap-
plication prior to Upjohn decision); Thomas W. Hyland & Andrea E. Forman, The
Attorney-Client Privilege in the Corporate Setting, 58 DEF. COUNS.J. 331 (1991) (giving
comprehensive overview of elements of attorney-client privilege and work-prod-
uct doctrine in corporate context); Stephen A. Saltzburg, Corporate and Related
Attorney-Client Privilege Claims: A Suggested Approach, 12 HOFSTRA L. REV. 279
(1984) (detailing disagreement over scope of attorney-client privilege and pro-
posing evaluation of attorney-client privilege claims based upon rationale un-
derlying privilege); David Simon, The Attorney-Client Privilege as Applied to
Corporations, 65 YALE L.J. 953 (1956) (early analysis of corporate attorney-client
privilege and issues raised by its application compared to issues raised by appli-
cation of individual attorney-client privilege).
47. Westinghouse, 951 F.2d at 1424.
48. 572 F.2d 596 (8th Cir. 1977). Under facts similar to those of Westing-
house, the SEC conducted an official investigation of Diversified. Id. at 600. Af-
ter the SEC investigation, Diversified employed outside counsel to prepare a
report on certain areas of the company. Id. Counsel eventually produced a
memorandum and a full report in conjunction with this investigation. Id. at 601.
This material was voluntarily disclosed to the SEC. Id. at 599. Because the court
determined these materials were not privileged, it never directly addressed the
question of waiver. Id. at 604. The court did intimate in a footnote, however,
11
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waiver theory in Permian Corp. v. United States.4 9 The Westinghouse court
agreed with the Permian court's holding and adopted most of its reason-
ing.50 The Westinghouse court concluded that Westinghouse had waived
its attorney-client privilege with respect to the earlier disclosed material
that it would recognize a continuing privilege after a voluntary disclosure of
privileged material. Id. n.l. The court said:
We would be reluctant to hold that voluntary surrender of privileged
material to a governmental agency in obedience to an agency subpoena
constitutes a waiver of the privilege for all purposes, including its use in
subsequent litigation in which the material is sought to be used against
the party which yielded to the agency.
Id. In a subsequent en banc hearing, the court in Diversified expressed concern
over discouraging internal investigations. Id. at 611. The court stated: "To hold
otherwise may have the effect of thwarting the developing procedure of corpora-
tions to employ independent outside counsel to investigate and advise them in
order to protect stockholders, potential stockholders and customers." Id.
49. 665 F.2d 1214 (D.C. Cir. 1981). The facts of Permian are also similar to
the situation in Westinghouse. In Permian, Occidental Corporation (Permian's
parent corporation) voluntarily disclosed material to the SEC pursuant to an
SEC investigation. Id. at 1216. All disclosed documents were to be stamped
with the following message in accordance with an agreement between Occiden-
tal and the SEC:
This Document constitutes a Trade Secret and/or Commercial or Fi-
nancial Information which is Privileged and Confidential and may not
be Released or Disclosed. Pursuant to procedures adopted by Occi-
dental & the Securities & Exchange Commission, this Document may
not be disclosed by the Commission to any third-party unless prior no-
tice of such proposed disclosure has been given to Occidental.
Id. at 1216 n.3. (quoting Permian v. United States, Civ. No. 79-2098, mem. op.
at 9 (D.D.C. May 15, 1980)).
Occidental argued that this agreement, and its associated message, was in-
tended to maintain its privilege with regard to the stamped material, and to pre-
vent the SEC from disclosing the material to any other parties. Id. at 1217. The
SEC then sought to disclose this information to the United States Department of
Energy. Id. Occidental brought suit to prevent disclosure, invoking the attor-
ney-client privilege. Id. The SEC agreed that this material was privileged but
argued that the privilege had been waived by Occidental's voluntary disclosure.
Id. The court held for the SEC and rejected the limited waiver rule of Diversified.
Id. at 1220. The court did not see how such a rule would further the purposes
underlying the attorney-client privilege. Id. The court observed that "[t]he cli-
ent cannot be permitted to pick and choose among his opponents, waiving the
privilege for some and resurrecting the claim of confidentiality to obstruct
others, or to invoke the privilege as to communications whose confidentiality he
has already compromised for his own benefit." Id. at 1221. The court also de-
clined to adopt the Diversified rationale for suggesting the validity of selective
waiver. Id. at 1220. The court remarked: "Unlike the Eighth Circuit, we cannot
see how 'the developing procedure of corporations to employ independent
outside counsel to investigate and advise them' would be thwarted by telling a
corporation that it cannot disclose the resulting reports to the SEC if it wishes to
maintain their confidentiality." Id. at 1221 n.13.
50. Westinghouse, 951 F.2d at 1425. The Westinghouse court agreed with the
Permian court's contention that a selective waiver did not further the goals un-
derlying the attorney-client or work-product doctrine privileges. Id. The West-
inghouse court, however, did not adopt the Permian court's fairness analysis as
additional justification for holding that a waiver existed on these facts. Id. at
1426.
12
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because the court was not persuaded to extend the privilege beyond its
underlying purpose.5 1
The Westinghouse court initially traced the judicial interpretations of
the purposes behind the attorney-client privilege.52 The court found
that the ultimate purpose has been characterized as "promot[ing]
broader public interests in the observance of law and the administration
ofjustice." s5 3 The court noted that this purpose is fostered by encourag-
ing open communication between attorneys and their clients. 54 Accord-
ing to the court, protecting attorney-client communications is essential
to the pursuit of justice.55 Without this protection, clients would sup-
press information they fear might be harmful to their case, even though
this information might be necessary for their attorney's defense prepara-
tion. 56 As a consequence, attorneys would be unable to provide their
clients with the most skillful representation. 5 7 The court relied on au-
thority which reasoned that this open communication between attorney
and client is vital for effective attorney representation, which in turn aids
in the attainment of justice.58
51. Id. at 1425-26. The Westinghouse court did not reject the selective waiver
rule based upon the Permian court's conclusion that selective waiver would be
unfair to other adversaries. Id. The Permian court noted that "[blecause the
attorney-client privilege inhibits the truth-finding process, it has been narrowly
construed, and courts have been vigilant to prevent litigants from converting the
privilege into a tool for selective disclosure." Permian, 665 F.2d at 1221 (citation
omitted). A party who has profited from disclosing protected information
should not subsequently be allowed to claim the use of the privilege. Id.
The Westinghouse court chose not rely on this reasoning. Westinghouse, 951
F.2d at 1426. The court noted that this fairness doctrine was used most often in
partial rather than selective disclosure cases. Id. The court concluded that the
facts in Westinghouse involved a selective disclosure and the fairness doctrine was
not applicable. Id. In a footnote, the court also questioned whether there was
anything unfair about permitting selective disclosure: "[W]hen a client discloses
privileged information to a government agency, the private litigant in subse-
quent proceedings is no worse off than it would have been had the disclosure to
the agency not occurred." Id. at 1426 n.13.
52. Westinghouse, 951 F.2d at 1423-24.
53. Id. at 1423 (quoting Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389
(1981)).
54. Id.
55. Id. The court stated that clients can share all information that will aid
their case with their attorney without fearing that potentially damaging informa-
tion will later be disclosed and used against them. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. (quoting Hunt v. Blackburn, 128 U.S. 464, 470 (1888)). In stressing
the importance of the attorney-client privilege, the Third Circuit noted:
[The attorney-client privilege] is founded upon the necessity, in the in-
terest and administration ofjustice, of the aid of persons having knowl-
edge of the law and skilled in its practice, which assistance can only be
safely and readily availed of when free from the consequences or the
apprehension of disclosure.
Id. (quoting Hunt, 128 U.S. at 470).
13
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The Westinghouse court stated that the attorney-client privilege is
usually waived upon voluntary disclosure to a third party.5 9 In the case
at bar, Westinghouse freely elected to furnish the government with in-
formation. 60 The court held that granting Westinghouse the benefit of
the attorney-client privilege under these circumstances was inconsistent
with the guidelines and goals of the privilege.6 ' Because Westinghouse
shared its information freely with the government, the privilege was not
necessary to foster open communication with an attorney in pursuing
legal advice. 6 2
Exceptions, however, do exist to the general rule that voluntary dis-
closure of protected information effects a waiver of the attorney-client
privilege.63 The Third Circuit determined that Westinghouse's disclo-
sure did not fall within any recognized exception. 64 Westinghouse
asked the court to create a new exception to the waiver doctrine
"designed to accommodate voluntary disclosure to government agen-
cies." 6 5 The court noted that the weight of authority had applied tradi-
tional waiver doctrine in this situation and the court discerned no
compelling reason to deviate from this policy. 66 The court reasoned
that a governmental agency exception would not promote an open ex-
change of information between attorney and client.6 7 Such an excep-
tion would only expand the attorney-client privilege's scope. 68
Although such an expansion would promote voluntary cooperation
with investigatory government agencies, the Westinghouse court agreed
with the first part of the reasoning of the District of Columbia Circuit in
Permian.69 The Permian court acknowledged that promoting voluntary
59. Id. at 1424; see also Permian Corp. v. United States, 665 F.2d 1214, 1219
(D.C. Cir. 1981) (attorney-client privilege was "destroyed" when documents
were disclosed to third party). But see Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572
F.2d 596, 602 (8th Cir. 1977) (attorney-client privilege is absolute until waived).
60. Westinghouse, 951 F.2d at 1417. The Third Circuit reasoned that if
Westinghouse felt comfortable sharing this information with the government,
Westinghouse would not need the protection of the attorney-client privilege to
share the information with the company's attorney. Id. at 1424.
61. Id. at 1425.
62. Id. at 1424.
63. Id. The Westinghouse court discussed certain circumstances where volun-
tary disclosure is consistent with the purpose of the privilege. Id. One such
circumstance is the disclosure of information to the attorney's agent who is as-
sisting the attorney in developing legal advice. Id. Another exception is the
disclosure of information between co-defendants or co-litigants. Id. The court
noted that "[those [two] exceptions are consistent with the goal underlying the
privilege because each type of disclosure is sometimes necessary for the client to
obtain informed legal advice." Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 1425.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 1425-26 (quoting Permian Corp. v. United States, 665 F.2d 1214
14
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 37, Iss. 4 [1992], Art. 12
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol37/iss4/12
THIRD CIRCUIT REVIEW
cooperation with government investigations was a "laudable activity,"
but explained that it was not one within the purposes of the attorney-
client privilege. 70 The court in Westinghouse questioned the effectiveness
and necessity of such an exception, noting that even if the exception
were available, "no such privilege was established at the time Westing-
house decided to cooperate with the SEC and the DOJ. ' ' 7 1 The creation
of such a privilege covering disclosure to government agencies had also
not been recognized by Congress. 7 2 Accordingly, the Third Circuit de-
clined to recognize a selective waiver of information protected by the
attorney-client privilege. 73
Westinghouse next argued that it had relied on the SEC's confiden-
tiality regulations and the confidentiality agreement it had signed with
the DOJ.74 Westinghouse claimed that these measures preserved the
(D.C. Cir. 1981)) (agreeing with Permian court's analysis rejecting the use of se-
lective waiver as an incentive to encourage corporate internal investigations but
declining to follow Permian court's characterization of selective waiver as unfair).
For a further discussion of Permian, see supra notes 49-51 and infra note 70 and
accompanying text.
70. Westinghouse, 951 F.2d at 1424-25 (quoting Permian, 665 F.2d at 1221).
The Third Circuit stated:
We agree with the D.C. Circuit that these objectives, however laudable,
are beyond the intended purposes of the attorney-client privilege ...
and therefore we find Westinghouse's policy arguments irrelevant to
our task of applying the attorney-client privilege to this case. In our
view, to go beyond the policies underlying the attorney-client privilege
on the rationale offered by Westinghouse would be to create an entirely
new privilege.
Id. at 1425 (citation omitted).
71. Id. at 1426.
72. Id. at 1425.
73. Id. at 1427.
74. Id. at 1426. For commentary on the issue of privilege and its waiver in
governmental investigations, see Donna Blalock, Does Compliance with Government
Agency Investigations Waive Attorney-Client Privilege?, 15 J. LEGAL PROF. 337 (1990)
(arguing for limited waiver theory over strict waiver theory); Dennis J. Block &
Nancy E. Barton, Securities Litigation: Waiver of the Attorney-Client Privilege by Disclo-
sures to the SEC, 10 SEC. REG. L.J. 170 (1982) (discussing conflicting case law and
arguing for adoption of limited waiver theory); Steven M. Abramowitz, Note,
Disclosure Under the Securities Laws: Implications for the Attorney-Client Privilege, 90
COLUM. L. REV. 456 (1990) (arguing for stringent needs test for determining
whether attorney-client communications leading to information published in
disclosure document in compliance with federal securities laws constituted a
waiver of attorney-client privilege); Comment, Stuffing the Rabbit Back Into the Hat:
Limited Waiver of the Attorney-Client Privilege in an Administrative Agency Investigation,
130 U. PA. L. REv. 1198 (1982) (arguing for traditional waiver theory instead of
selective waiver theory concerning corporate disclosure to governmental admin-
istrative agencies); Beth S. Dorris, Note, The Limited Waiver Rule: Creation of an
SEC-Corporation Privilege, 36 STAN. L. REV. 789 (1984) (supporting abolition of
limited waiver rule as upholding attorney-client privilege and encouraging vol-
untary disclosure to SEC); Martin P. Hicks, Note, Limited Waiver of the Attorney-
Client Privilege Upon Voluntary Disclosure to the SEC, 50 FORDHAM L. REV. 963 (1982)
(tracing purpose of attorney-client privilege, its position in today's legal system
19921
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attorney-client privilege protection for the information disclosed. 75 The
Westinghouse court rejected this claim, citing traditional waiver doctrine
which holds that "a voluntary disclosure to a third party waives the at-
torney-client privilege even if the third party agrees not to disclose the
communications to anyone else."17 6 In support of the traditional waiver
doctrine, the court emphasized that Westinghouse's disclosures in both
instances were voluntary and, therefore, Westinghouse had waived its
attorney-client privilege. 7 7
and arguing that waiver of privilege upon voluntary disclosure to SEC is consis-
tent with ideals of privilege).
For a discussion of waiver of privilege in other comparable situations, see
Fred Russell Harwell, Waiving the Attorney-Client Privilege in "Hybrid" Internal Reve-
nue Service Investigations, 13 J. LEGAL PROF. 287 (1988) (disclosure of attorney-
client protected information during civil IRS audit waives privilege's protection
in subsequent litigation); Chris G. Outlaw, Note, Corporate Attorney-Client Privilege-
Waiver by a Bankruptcy Trustee, 60 TUL. L. REV. 1307 (1986) (supporting decision
to endow trustee in bankruptcy as party with power to exercise or waive attor-
ney-client privilege).
75. Westinghouse, 951 F.2d at 1426-27.
76. Id. at 1427 (footnote omitted). The court first examined the DOJ agree-
ment that was kept confidential and memorialized by court order. Id. at 1419,
1426. This agreement stipulated that the DOJ could review, but not copy, privi-
leged material at the offices of Westinghouse's attorneys only. Id. at 1419. The
agreement further stated that any information gathered could not be divulged to
anyone outside the DOJ. Id. Finally, the agreement specifically provided that
these acts of disclosure would not constitute a waiver of the-attorney-client privi-
lege. Id. The court noted that the agreement preserved Westinghouse's attor-
ney-client privilege protection as between Westinghouse and the DOJ but made
no mention of any other parties. Id. at 1427. The court thus held that nothing
in the agreement or facts precluded application of the traditional waiver doc-
trine. Id.
The court then evaluated Westinghouse's reliance on the SEC's confidenti-
ality regulations. Id. at 1426-27. These regulations "provided that the SEC
would maintain confidentiality as to information and documents obtained in the
course of any investigation." Id. at 1427. The court held that Westinghouse's
reliance upon these regulations to preserve its attorney-client privilege was un-
reasonable. Id. Two reasons guided the court's rejection of this theory. Id.
First, the court observed that the same regulations contained language counsel-
ing against relying on them to preserve this privilege. Id. (citing 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.0-.04 (1978)). The regulations specifically stated "that information ob-
tained in the course of a non-public investigation must be made a matter of
public record and provided upon request if the disclosure of the confidential
information was not 'contrary to the public interest.' " Id. (quoting 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.0-.04 (1978)). Thus, the court must have reasoned that disclosure of
Westinghouse's information would not have been contrary to the public interest.
See id. Second, the court observed that the SEC had recently failed in an attempt
to provide statutorily for a selective waiver. Id. (citing SEC Statement in Support of
Proposed § 24(d) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, 16 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. at
461 (March 2, 1984)).
77. Id. at 1427 n.14. The Westinghouse court, however, strongly suggested
that their decision might have been different had the disclosure been compelled,
not voluntary. Id. The court stated:
We consider Westinghouse's disclosure to the DOJ to be voluntary
even though it was prompted by a grand jury subpoena. Although
Westinghouse originally moved to quash the subpoena, it later with-
932
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B. The Work-Product Doctrine: How Much Protection?
Westinghouse also argued that the work-product doctrine protected
the information given to the SEC and the DOJ. 78 Westinghouse as-
serted that its voluntary disclosure did not waive this protection. 79 The
Third Circuit rejected Westinghouse's alternative claim.80
The Third Circuit looked to the Eighth Circuit and the D.C. Circuit
for guidance on this issue. 8 1 The Third Circuit first detailed the pur-
pose of the work-product doctrine.8 2 The court concluded that "the
work-product doctrine promotes the adversary system directly by pro-
tecting the confidentiality of papers prepared by or on behalf of attor-
neys in anticipation of litigation."'8 3 This confidentiality furthers the
adversary system by "enabling attorneys to prepare cases without fear
that their work product will be used against their clients."
8 4
The court next examined what circumstances would constitute a
waiver of the work-product doctrine.8 5 Unlike the attorney-client privi-
lege, voluntary disclosure to a third party of information protected by
the work-product doctrine does not automatically waive the privilege. 8 6
The work-product protection operates to prevent adversaries from ac-
quiring opposing counsel's work product.8 7 Most courts hold that
waiver of the privilege through voluntary disclosure occurs only when
this disclosure will result in an opponent acquiring the information.88
Accordingly, the threshold issue in such a voluntary disclosure case is
whether the party receiving the information is an adversary.8 9 Westing-
house argued that it was cooperating with the SEC and the DOJ when it
drew the motion and produced the documents pursuant to the confi-
dentiality agreement. Had Westinghouse continued to object to the
subpoena and produced the documents only after being ordered to do
so, we would not consider its disclosure of these doscuments to be
voluntary.
Id.
78. Id. at 1427. For a further discussion of the work-product doctrine, see
supra note 11.
79. Westinghouse, 951 F.2d at 1427.
80. Id. at 1429.
81. Id. at 1427.
82. Id. at 1427-28.
83. Id. at 1428.
84. Id. (citing Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 510-11 (1947)). For a fur-
ther discussion of the Hickman case and the doctrine it espoused, see supra note
11.
85. Westinghouse, 951 F.2d at 1428.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.; see also In re Chrysler Motors Corp. Overnight Evaluation Program
Litig., 860 F.2d 845, 846 (8th Cir. 1988); United States v. AT&T, 642 F.2d 1285,
1299 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Grumman Aerospace Corp. v. Titanium Metals Corp. of
Am., 91 F.R.D. 84, 90 (E.D.N.Y. 1981).
89. Westinghouse, 951 F.2d at 1428.
19921 933
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disclosed the requested information and thus was not an adversary to
either agency. 90 The court summarily rejected this argument because
Westinghouse was the target of the SEC and the DOJ investigations. 9 1
The court held that "[u]nder the circumstances, we have no difficulty
concluding that the SEC and the DOJ were Westinghouse's
adversaries., "92
However, the conclusion that Westinghouse and the government
agencies were adversaries did not terminate the Westinghouse court's
analysis of the issue.93 The Third Circuit addressed whether Westing-
house's prior disclosure acted to waive the work-product doctrine as
against the Philippines. 94 Although courts generally agree that disclo-
sure to an adversary waives the work-product protection, they disagree
over the reasons. 95 Such disagreement precludes an easy application of
this privilege in particular situations. 9 6
Seeking guidance, the Third Circuit initially considered the work-
product doctrine as formulated by the Eighth Circuit in In re Chrysler
Motors Corp. Overnight Evaluation Program Litigation.9 7 In this case, a cor-
poration revealed work-product information to an adversary during set-
tlement negotiations.98 This disclosure transpired after an agreement
was reached between the parties that precluded further disclosure of this
material. 9 9 The Eighth Circuit held that disclosure to an adversary of
information protected by the work-product doctrine effected a total
waiver of such protection. ' 0 0 The court rejected the claim that the con-
fidentiality agreement prevented a waiver of the privilege.' 0 '
The bright line rule enunciated by the Eighth Circuit in Chrysler Mo-
tors differed sharply from the D.C. Circuit's approach in In re Subpoenas
Duces Tecum. 102 In Subpoenas, a corporation voluntarily disclosed materi-
als protected by the work-product doctrine to the SEC to benefit from
90. Id. An adverse party is defined as "[a] party to an action whose interests
are opposed to or opposite the interests of another party to the action."
BLAcK's LAW DICTIONARY 53 (6th ed. 1990).
91. Westinghouse, 951 F.2d at 1428. The court noted that Westinghouse was
not assisting with the SEC or the DOJ investigations, rather it was the target of
these investigations. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. For a discussion of the Philippines' request for the information and
Westinghouse's claim of protection under the work-product doctrine, see supra
notes 40-41 and accompanying text.
95. Westinghouse, 951 F.2d at 1428.
96. Id.
97. 860 F.2d 844 (8th Cir. 1988).
98. Id. at 845.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 844-45.
101. Id. at 847.
102. 738 F.2d 1367 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
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the SEC's Voluntary Disclosure Program.' 0 3 The Subpoenas court em-
ployed a three-part balancing test to determine whether disclosure ef-
fected a waiver.10 4 This test evaluated "the fairness of selectively
disclosing work-product, the discloser's expectations of confidentiality,
and the policy underlying the work-product doctrine."' 1 5 Applying this
test, the Subpoenas court held that it would be unfair to permit selective
waiver by disclosing to one adversary and not to another. 10 6 In addi-
tion, the court determined that the corporation had no reasonable ex-
pectation of confidentiality in the disclosed information. 10 7 Finally,
there was no other applicable work-product doctrine policy that would
mandate a denial of the waiver in these particular circumstances. 10 8
The Third Circuit in Westinghouse examined the approaches of both
Chrysler Motors and Subpoenas but declined to adopt either one.109 In-
stead, the Third Circuit held that Westinghouse's disclosure to the SEC
and the DOJ waived the corporation's work-product protection as
against all other adversaries."10 The court emphasized the importance
of the underlying purpose of the privilege by noting that a party could
preserve the privilege in the face of disclosure by proving that "the dis-
closure furthered the doctrine's underlying goal."' However, the
court concluded that Westinghouse's disclosures to the governmental
agencies were not made to further the underlying goal of the work-prod-
uct doctrine. 1 2
Two factors contributed to the Westinghouse court's adoption of this
standard for determining a waiver of the work-product doctrine."
13
First, the court noted the important general principle mandating a nar-
row interpretation of evidentiary privileges." 4 Second, the court recog-
nized that unlike the absolute protection afforded by the attorney-client
privilege, the work-product doctrine is a qualified privilege that may be
overcome by a showing of "substantial need."' ' 15 The qualified protec-
tion status persuaded the court "that the standard for waiving the work-
103. Id. at 1368-69. The Subpoenas court stated that this program
"promises wrongdoers more lenient treatment and the chance to avoid formal
investigation and litigation in return for thorough self-investigation and com-
plete disclosure of the results to the SEC." Id. at 1369 (quoting In re Subpoenas
Duces Tecum, 99 F.R.D. 582, 584 (1983)).
104. Id. at 1372.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Westinghouse, 951 F.2d at 1428-29.
110. Id. at 1429.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
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product doctrine should be no more stringent than the standard for
waiving the attorney-client privilege."' 16 Applying the stated standard,
the Third Circuit held that Westinghouse's disclosures waived the work-
product protection "because they were not made to further the goal un-
derlying the doctrine," which is to promote the adversary system by pro-
tecting attorneys' papers created in preparation of litigation.' 17
The court viewed Westinghouse's objective in disclosing this infor-
mation as purely self-serving, an attempt to either preclude prosecution
or receive lenient treatment." 8 The court determined that these objec-
tives, while understandable, did not in any way further the goal of the
work-product doctrine and should not preclude waiver of the privi-
lege. 1'9 The court noted that its approach would still permit attorneys
to enjoy the full benefit of the work-product doctrine, provided neither
the attorneys nor their clients disclosed protected material to an
adversary. ' 2
0
The court then disposed of Westinghouse's contention that its rea-
sonable expectation that the SEC and the DOJ would maintain the confi-
dentiality of the disclosed information precluded the waiver of its
privilege.121 Westinghouse advanced two cases decided by the D.C. Cir-
cuit in support of its position, Subpoenas 122 and In re Sealed Case.'12 The
Third Circuit distinguished Sealed Case because that case involved both a
selective and a partial waiver.' 2 4 A partial waiver permits a party to pro-
tect the undisclosed portion of a document that has been partially dis-
closed to another party. 125 The D.C. Circuit in Sealed Case employed a
fairness analysis to decide the waiver issue.' 26 The Westinghouse case,
however, only involved a selective waiver theory.' 2 7 In Subpoenas, the
116. Id.
117. Id. at 1429.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id. The court speculated that recognition of selective waiver in these
circumstances might actually work against the purpose of the work-product doc-
trine. Id. The court stated:
If internal investigations are undertaken with an eye to later disclosing
the results to a government agency, the outside counsel conducting the
investigation may hesitate to pursue unfavorable information or legal
theories about the corporation. Thus, allowing a party to preserve the
doctrine's protection while disclosing work product to a government
agency could actually discourage attorneys from fully preparing their
cases.
Id. at 1429-30.
121. Id. at 1430.
122. 738 F.2d 1367 (D.C. Cir. 1984). For a discussion of Subpoenas, see
supra notes 102-08 and accompanying text.
123. 676 F.2d 793 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
124. Westinghouse, 951 F.2d at 1430.
125. Id. at 1423 n.7.
126. Id. at 1430.
127. Id.
936 [Vol. 37: p. 917
20
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 37, Iss. 4 [1992], Art. 12
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol37/iss4/12
THIRD CIRCUIT REVIEW
D.C. Circuit affirmed the fairness analysis used in Sealed Case in the con-
text of a selective disclosure. 12 8 The Westinghouse court restated that
when analyzing selective waiver under the attorney-client privilege, a
fairness analysis only applied to a partial, not selective, disclosure of
protected material. 12 9 The court held that this limitation of the fairness
analysis was also applicable in the context of the work-product doc-
trine.130 The Third Circuit concluded that "[it did] not see how disclos-
ing protected materials to one adversary disadvantages another," and
thus Subpoenas and Sealed Case did not support Westinghouse's posi-
tion. 13 1 The court thus rejected Westinghouse's claim for protection
under the work-product doctrine.' 32
IV. CONCLUSION
The Third Circuit's decision in Westinghouse highlights a split among
the federal circuits in an area of great importance to corporations and
their counsel.' 3 3 There exists much disagreement over the scope of the
corporate attorney-client and work-product doctrine privileges and the
circumstances under which they can be waived.' 34 The Westinghouse
court followed the general rule regarding waiver of the attorney-client
privilege, holding that voluntary disclosure of material protected by the
privilege completely waives the protection. 135 The Third Circuit also
followed the majority of courts which hold that voluntary disclosure of
work-product protected material to an adversary constitutes a waiver of
the work-product privilege. 136 In analyzing the waiver of both privi-
leges, the Westinghouse court accorded the privileges a narrow interpreta-
tion that the court thought was consistent with the privileges' underlying
purposes. ' 37 This decision should have a significant impact on corpora-
tions incorporated in the Third Circuit as well as corporations incorpo-
rated elsewhere.
The Third Circuit held that a selective waiver theory was inconsis-
128. In re Subpoenas Duces Tecum, 738 F.2d 1367, 1371 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
129. Westinghouse, 951 F.2d at 1430. For a discussion of the Westinghouse
court's rejection of the fairness analysis in the context of a selective waiver, see
supra note 51.
130. Westinghouse, 951 F.2d at 1430.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. See Permian Corp. v. United States, 665 F.2d 1214 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
For a discussion of the D.C. Circuit's examination of the attorney-client privi-
lege, see supra notes 49, 51 & 69-70 and accompanying text. But see Diversified
Industries Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596 (8th Cir. 1977). For a discussion of the
Eighth Circuit's analysis of the attorney-client privilege, see supra note 48 and
accompanying text.
134. See Permian, 665 F.2d 1214. But see Diversified, 572 F.2d 596.
135. Westinghouse, 951 F.2d at 1425, 1431.
136. Id. at 1428, 1431.
137. Id. at 1425, 1429.
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tent with and failed to further the goals behind the attorney-client and
work-product doctrine privileges.' 38 The court also noted that a selec-
tive waiver was not within any recognized exception to the general
waiver rule.' 39 The court thus declined to expand these well-settled
privileges by recognizing a selective waiver exception to the general
waiver rule. ' 40
The Third Circuit's decision closely mirrored the D.C. Circuit's de-
cision in Permian. In deciding whether to recognize a selective waiver,
the Permian court examined the underlying policy goals promoted by the
privileges. 14 ' The Third Circuit rejected an alternative approach articu-
lated by the Eighth Circuit in Diversified.'4 2 The Third Circuit's more
conservative approach recognized the Diversified court's goal of encour-
aging corporations to conduct internal investigations and to cooperate
with Federal investigative agencies.14 3
The Westinghouse court correctly interpreted existing case law and
the policies underlying the attorney-client and work-product doctrine
privileges. The Westinghouse court recognized that these evidentiary pro-
tections, while important, may have detrimental effects and thus must be
narrowly construed. ' 4 4 The Westinghouse court's refusal to expand these
privileges beyond their recognized parameters prevents further with-
holding of relevant evidence. The Westinghouse court's decision is consis-
tent with a narrow interpretation of the privileges. 145
Despite its narrow construction, the Westinghouse court's decision
did uphold the protection afforded by these privileges. The impact of
the Westinghouse decision will lie in future determinations of what consti-
tutes a waiver of these privileges. While recognizing that the material at
issue in Westinghouse was protected by the attorney-client and work-prod-
uct doctrine privileges, ' 46 the court merely held that Westinghouse vol-
untarily waived this protection when it freely disclosed the
information. 14 7 Because the attorney-client and work-product doctrine
138. Id. at 1424 (citing Permian, 665 F.2d at 1220).
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Permian Corp. v. United States, 665 F.2d 1214, 1220 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
For a discussion of Permian, see supra notes 49-51 & 69-70 and accompanying
text.
142. Westinghouse, 951 F.2d at 1424. The Third Circuit stated that the Diver-
sified court recognized the selective waiver theory, stating that disclosure to the
SEC during an investigation of material protected by the attorney-client privi-
lege constituted a selective waiver of the privilege. Id. at 1423. Because the
attorney-client privilege was only selectively waived, the Third Circuit noted that
the disclosed material in Diversified remained protected for ensuing civil litiga-
tion. Id. For a discussion of Diversified, see supra note 48 and accompanying text.
143. Westinghouse, 951 F.2d at 1425.
144. Id. at 1429.
145. Id. at 1425, 1429.
146. Id. at 1431.
147. Id.
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protections maintain the confidentiality of certain information, volun-
tary disclosure of this information may logically lead to the conclusion
that the information did not need the protection of these privileges.
The Third Circuit and the decisions relied upon in its analysis recog-
nized this in denying the selective waiver theory.' 48
The Westinghouse court's decision, however, provides only limited
guidance. Corporations targeted for governmental investigations will
now refuse to cooperate because of the uncertainty surrounding what
types of disclosures will waive the attorney-client or work-product doc-
trine privileges. This uncertainty will create problems for companies
"voluntarily" engaging in internal investigations at the request of the
government. Companies may not be as forthcoming with information
for fear that they will waive their privileges for purposes of future litiga-
tion. The government will not be able to offer any concrete assurances.
This confusion will likely increase the time, cost and difficulty of govern-
mental investigations into companies.
In the Third Circuit, the Westinghouse decision's impact on compa-
nies will likely be more predictable. This decision gives companies and
governmental investigators a clear exposition of the Third Circuit's ap-
proach in this area. Companies subject to governmental investigation
who are interested in preserving their privileges in the Third Circuit and
maintaining future confidentiality should, and probably will, cease to
disclose voluntarily any protected information to the government. The
fear will stem from the knowledge that once a privilege is waived, it is
waived completely and forever. This will also result in a substantial chil-
ling of communication between governmental investigators and compa-
nies in the Third Circuit.
The issue of waiver of a corporate attorney-client or work-product
doctrine privilege in the context of a governmental investigation de-
pends on the particular jurisdiction's law. This area is extremely impor-
tant because of its impact on the government's ability to investigate
corporate misconduct and its effect on a corporation's willingness to as-
sist in that investigation while still protecting itself and its shareholders.
A corporation in any jurisdiction in this country likely will not volunta-
rily disclose any protected information to the government, given the un-
certain status of the law. A company willing to cooperate with
governmental investigators should know the boundaries within which it
can cooperate without harming itself. The issue regarding the limits of
privileges and their waiver needs a definitive answer from the United
States Supreme Court or from Congress. Such a resolution would hope-
fully eliminate the confusion and enable corporations under govern-
mental investigation to cooperate confidently, not fearfully.
Thomas E. Smallman
148. Id.
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